The New York Times and Wall Street Journal both have articles on problems with port security today.
The New York Times makes the legitimate point in "Big Problem, Dubai Deal or Not" that there are gaping holes in port security at this time regardless of who operates the ports. Only 4 percent or 5 percent of containers are inspected, according to the Times. "There is virtually no standard for how containers are sealed, or for certifying the identities of thousands of drivers who enter and leave the ports to pick them up."
This New York Times article also argues, not entirely convincingly, that transferring ownership of a company operating at six major ports to a United Arab Emirates firm would have little or no practical impact on these security concerns. Yet even the Times acknowledges that, "While the company in question has not been a focus of investigations, Dubai has been a way station for contraband, some of it nuclear. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani nuclear engineer, made Dubai his transshipment point for the equipment he sent to Libya and Iran because he could operate there without worrying about investigators."
The New York Times also incongruently brings forward losing presidential candidate Sen. John Kerry as an advocate for port security, or, more accurately, as an advocate for using any opportunity to attack the current White House. "It raises a lot of questions about the lobbying, the connections and the terms of the deal, and the security problems the administration has left unaddressed." Yes, THAT John Kerry, who argued in the presidential debates that we should offer nuclear technology to Iran.
(The New York Times acknowledges that brazen political opportunism involved, noting that the port issue "is also convenient for the Democrats, who are able to sound more hawkish on domestic security than President Bush." The key word is "sound.")
The Wall Street Journal notes in "Security Gaps Already Plague Ports" that U.S. ports have long been ill-prepared for a terrorist attack -- regardless of the nationality of the owner. An example:
Experts have long seen ports as a vulnerable target and worried that terrorists might one day use the world's global shipping network to launch an attack. Their fears were deepened in March 2004, when two suicide bombers from the Gaza Strip stowed away in a false compartment of a shipping container bound for Israel. Israeli security officials believe that the bombers were targeting the port's fuel depot when guards discovered them. The bombers detonated early, and 10 people died in the explosion, including the bombers.
Security is questionable at a Baltimore port that the Arab company is poised to begin operating:
At least one of the ports where DP World is set to operate, Baltimore, has been dogged by security shortcomings for years. A Baltimore Sun investigation in June 2005 revealed that the port's fiber-optic alarm system on the perimeter fence malfunctioned and was usually switched off, and that port police were so understaffed that their patrol boats often dry-docked because there was no one to operate them. The newspaper also found that a pair of "video cameras" guarding the entrance to one important marine terminal were actually blocks of wood on poles.
Last summer, a tour of the port, the nation's eighth largest, revealed gaps in perimeter fences, unattended gates, surveillances systems that didn't work and insufficient police patrols on land and sea. State officials have acknowledged security gaps and said they have been working to close them.
It gets worse:
A government program meant to provide standard identification cards and background checks for port security workers has stalled over what kind of identification technology should be employed. "At least 11,000 truckers go in and out of the Port of L.A.-Long Beach every day with only a driver's license," Mr. Flynn said. "There is no way for the port to even know who is really on its property at any time. These are not issues that have anything to do with who owns the terminal."
The bottom line is that America is vulnerable because of the vast amount of commerce in which it engages. Port security does deserve a closer look, but it is not the responsibility solely or primarily of federal, state, or local governmental agencies. Federal agents cannot be everywhere, nor would we want them to be. The federal government should be the last line of defense when it comes to port security, not the first or only. The Wall Street Journal notes that Earl Freilino, a former FBI counterterrorism agent who has worked on port security in Philadelphia, is opposed to the DP World deal. He says that the company, as a terminal operator, could have access to sensitive information about the movement of military cargo.
Frank Gaffney at National Review Online has more troubling information about the company poised to take over the ports and the United Arab Emirates itself. Gaffney predicts that if this issue is allowed to play itself out fully, the House and Senate will pass a bill stopping the takeover, with veto-proof margins.
Who owns the port operations matters. Handing the keys to America's major port operations to a company owned by a nation that is too closely allied with too many of our enemies remains a dicey proposition, if not a downright bad idea.
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More commentary at A Certain Slant of Light and Legal Redux. Michelle Malkin's website is also back up after a temporary disruption, and adds more details.
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